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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3983 
___________ 
 
NATHAN RILEY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL DECARLO, Correctional Food Service Manager 1; 
WALLACE DITTSWORTH, Correctional Food Service Manager 2; 
JEFF ROGERS, Correctional Classification Program Manager 
LOUIS FOLINO, Superintendant; REV. ALEDA MENCHYK, Facility 
Chaplaincy Program Director; NEDRO GREGO, RN Supervisor; 
J NIEHENKE, Former Safety Manager; FNU CUMBERLEDGE, Safety Manager; 
STEVE BLAZE, Facility Maintenance Manager 3; DORINA VARNER, Chief 
Grievance Officer; JEFFREY A. BEARD, Former Secretary of Corrections 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-00537) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 31, 2013 
 
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed, February 13, 2013) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Nathan Riley, an inmate currently incarcerated at SCI Greene in Waynesburg, 
Pennsylvania and proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment to Appellees 
and dismissing one of his Eighth Amendment claims with prejudice.  Because this appeal 
does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s 
order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  After being transferred to SCI Greene in May 2007, Riley was 
immediately placed into administrative custody because he faced danger from another 
inmate.  He was kept in administrative custody until December 17, 2010.  In his 
complaint, Riley alleges that during his stay in the restricted housing unit (“RHU”), he 
was served a diet containing approximately one-third of the calories provided to general 
population inmates and that he suffered substantial weight loss, constant hunger, 
weakness, and fatigue as a result.  He also asserts that he was served meals on unsanitary 
and contaminated food service trays.  Furthermore, Riley argues that the ventilation 
system in the RHU was not adequately maintained and that the resulting air quality 
caused him to suffer various physical ailments. 
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Riley filed his civil rights complaint 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  After conducting discovery, Appellees filed a motion for 
summary judgment on February 24, 2012.  On September 25, 2012, the District Court 
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granted summary judgment to Appellees and dismissed Riley‟s Eighth Amendment claim 
regarding the Department of Correction‟s (“DOC”) tuberculosis test procedures with 
prejudice.  Riley then timely filed this appeal. 
II. 
 We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court‟s order granting summary judgment and dismissing Riley‟s Eighth 
Amendment claim.  See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009); Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may summarily affirm on any basis 
supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam). 
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007)).  This Court affirms a district court‟s dismissal for failure to state a claim 
“only if, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, we determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief 
under any reasonable reading of the complaint.”  McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 
114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Furthermore, summary judgment is appropriate only when the record “shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “The moving party has the burden of 
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demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and summary 
judgment is to be entered if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find 
only for the moving party.”  Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citing Anderson  v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 
III. 
 Section 1983 provides private citizens with a means to redress violations of federal 
law committed by state individuals.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  To establish a claim under § 
1983, a plaintiff “must establish that she was deprived of a federal constitutional or 
statutory right by a state actor.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Riley first alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because of the 
conditions of confinement he endured in the RHU.  The relevant inquiry is whether the 
alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” and whether the inmate has been deprived of 
the “minimal civilized measure of life‟s necessities.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
834 (1994) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).  An inmate must 
demonstrate that “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious 
harm” and that prison officials demonstrated “deliberate indifference” to his health or 
safety.  Id.  However, only “extreme deprivations” are sufficient to sufficiently allege 
claims for conditions of confinement.  Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992).  
“Relevant considerations include the length of confinement, the amount of time prisoners 
must spend in their cells each day, sanitation, lighting, bedding, ventilation, noise, 
education and rehabilitation programs, opportunities for activities outside the cells, and 
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the repair and functioning of basic physical activities such as plumbing, ventilation and 
showers.”  Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Tillery v. Owens, 907 
F.2d 418, 427 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 First, Riley asserts that Appellees violated his Eighth Amendment rights by 
serving him a diet containing one-third of the calories provided to general population 
inmates.  However, Riley has provided no evidence to support this contention.  
Furthermore, although Riley weighed approximately 163 pounds during District Court 
proceedings and weighed 187 pounds five years earlier, this is insufficient to support his 
claim that he was subjected to a semi-starvation diet.  Accordingly, the District Court 
properly granted summary judgment to Appellees. 
 Riley also asserts that Appellees failed to maintain the ventilation system in the 
RHU and subjected him to poor air quality that made him suffer various physical 
ailments.  Here, the record reflects that officials cleaned the ducts and changed the filters; 
accordingly, officials were not indifferent to the conditions of the ventilation system. 
Although Riley‟s medical records establish that he received treatment for allergies 
and congestion at various times, medical staff did not recommend that he be moved to 
another cell, and his lungs were characterized as “clear.”  Moreover, nothing in the record 
indicates that prison officials were aware of these maladies and deliberately continued to 
ignore maintenance of the ventilation system.   See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 
(3d Cir. 2004) (noting that non-medical prison officials will not be charged with 
deliberate indifference absent a reason to believe or actual knowledge that medical staff 
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are mistreating a prisoner); see also Durmer v. O‟Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Riley also has not shown that the ventilation system in the RHU caused his ailments.  
Therefore, we agree with the District Court that summary judgment was warranted for 
Appellees as to this claim. 
Riley also alleges that Appellees violated his Eighth Amendment rights by serving 
him meals on unsanitary and contaminated food service trays during his time in the RHU.  
However, this claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  This doctrine bars a 
plaintiff who has received a final judgment on the merits in one action from litigating 
another suit against the same parties based on the same cause of action.  See CoreStates 
Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1999).  A litigant is precluded 
from raising a claim where “there has been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior 
suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the 
same causes of action.”  United States v. Athlone Indus. Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 
1984).  Whether two causes of action are identical generally depends on a consideration 
of (1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for recovery are the same; (2) 
whether the same witnesses and documents will be necessary in the trial in both cases; 
and (3) whether the material facts alleged are the same.  See id. at 984. 
Here, the District Court properly concluded that res judicata applied to Riley‟s 
claim regarding the trays.  First, Riley received a final judgment on the merits when the 
Honorable Nora Barry Fischer dismissed with prejudice an identical claim in Blount v. 
Folino, No. 10-697, 2011 WL 2489894, at *1, *11-*13 (W.D. Pa. June 21, 2011).  See 
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Federated Dep‟t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (a “dismissal for 
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a judgment on 
the merits” and has claim preclusive effect).  Second, Riley and Appellees DeCarlo and 
Dittsworth were parties to the suit in Blount.  Finally, Blount presented the same cause of 
action presented here: that DeCarlo and Dittsworth violated Riley‟s Eighth Amendment 
rights by using allegedly unsanitary and contaminated food service trays.  Furthermore, it 
is irrelevant that Riley filed the complaint that is the subject of this appeal before Judge 
Fischer dismissed his claim in Blount.  See Rest. 2d Judg. § 14 (1982) (“For purposes of 
res judicata, the effective date of a final judgment is the date of its rendition, without 
regard to the date of commencement of the action in which it is rendered or the action in 
which it is to be given effect.”).  Accordingly, the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment to Appellees on this claim. 
Finally, Riley asserts that Appellees violated his Eighth Amendment rights by 
confining him to “medical keeplock” in the RHU for refusing to submit to a purified 
protein derivative (“PPD”) test for tuberculosis.  The PPD test requires a small portion of 
PPD to be placed under the patient‟s skin.  However, the record establishes that Riley has 
never been forced to undergo a PPD test against his will and that he was never sanctioned 
for his refusal because his confinement in the RHU was never based upon his refusal to 
submit to the PPD test.  Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed this claim.
1
 
                                              
1
 The District Court did not provide Riley leave to amend this claim before dismissing it 
with prejudice.  We conclude that the District Court did not err in declining to allow 
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Riley further alleges that officials violated his rights under the First Amendment‟s 
Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment‟s Equal Protection Clause by not 
providing a Halal meat diet for Muslims and because of the DOC procedures concerning 
the PPD test.  “Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, 
including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.”  O‟Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation omitted).  However, an inmate only 
“retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a 
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”  Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).  To determine whether a regulation infringing upon 
constitutional rights is reasonable, courts apply the four factors set forth in Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  These factors require courts to consider: (1) “whether the 
regulation bears a „valid rational connection‟ to a legitimate and neutral government 
objective;” (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain 
open to prison inmates;” (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional 
right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources 
generally;” and (4) “the absence of ready alternatives.”  Id. at 89-90; see also Fraise v. 
Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 513-14 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).   
                                                                                                                                                  
Riley an opportunity to amend because we do not see how any amendment to his 
complaint would save his claims.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 
114 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that court should not dismiss pro se complaints without 
granting leave to amend unless “amendment would be inequitable or futile”). 
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With regard to Riley‟s Equal Protection claim, “Turner is equally applicable [], 
and the appropriate analysis for this claim is the same as that for [his] Free Exercise 
claim.”  DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 61 (3d Cir. 2000).  Generally, prison officials 
cannot discriminate against inmates of different religions.  Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 
(1972) (per curiam).  However, an inmate “cannot obtain relief if the difference between 
the defendants‟ treatment of him and their treatment of [inmates of another religion] is 
„reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.‟”  DeHart, 227 F.3d at 61. 
According to Riley, prison officials have violated his First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights by choosing not to provide a Halal meat diet to all Muslim inmates 
while providing a kosher diet for Jewish inmates.  However, the record reflects that most 
Muslims incarcerated within the DOC eat the alternative protein diet or the no animal 
products diet to be in accord with their religious beliefs.  Furthermore, the DOC does not 
provide a Halal meat diet because such a diet would significantly impact prison resources 
because of the cost of Halal meats.  Additional staff would be needed to check the food 
deliveries for security purposes, and kosher meat would also need to be ordered for 
Jewish inmates to avoid equal protection problems.  Accordingly, Appellees have 
demonstrated a legitimate government objective underlying its decision not to serve a 
Halal meat diet.  See Turner, 482 at 89. 
Furthermore, Appellees have submitted evidence that Riley has been provided 
numerous opportunities to request the no animal products diet but has refused to do so.  
Therefore, Riley has alternative ways of observing his religious beliefs.  See id. at 90.  
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Likewise, Appellees have satisfied the third and fourth Turner factors by demonstrating 
the deleterious impact serving a Halal meat diet would have on other inmates, prison 
officials, and prison resources and by noting that an alternative—the no animal products 
diet—does already exist at de minimus cost.  See id.  Given the record, we agree with the 
District Court that summary judgment was warranted for Appellees on this claim. 
Riley also asserts that the DOC‟s policy of administering a PPD test for 
tuberculosis violates his religious beliefs because the form of testing is forbidden under 
the tenets of Islam.  However, as noted above, Riley was never forced to undergo a PPD 
test against his will, and he was never confined in the RHU for his failure to submit.  
Accordingly, Riley has not met his burden of demonstrating that the DOC‟s regulations 
concerning PPD testing interfered with the practice of his religion, and the District Court 
properly granted summary judgment to Appellees for this claim. 
According to Riley, the DOC‟s regulations concerning religious diets and PPD 
testing also violated his rights under the RLUIPA.  The RLUIPA “protects 
institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are 
therefore dependent on the government‟s permission and accommodation for exercise of 
their religion.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005).  The statute states that: 
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise 
of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government 
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person— 
 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
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(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). 
“[A] substantial burden exists where: (1) a follower is forced to choose between 
following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available 
to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive 
a benefit; OR (2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially 
modify his behavior to violate his beliefs.”  Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  If an inmate satisfies his initial burden of showing that a practice 
substantially burdens his religious exercise, the burden then shifts to the government to 
show that the challenged policy “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest 
and is the least restrictive means” to enforce that interest.  Id. at 283 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
2000cc-1(a)).  As discussed above, however, Riley has not demonstrated that the DOC‟s 
decision to not serve a Halal meat diet and its policies concerning PPD testing have 
substantially burdened his religious exercise.  Therefore, the District Court properly 
granted summary judgment to Appellees for Riley‟s claims under the RLUIPA. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
